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The question of the nttitude of the Court to a beneficiary 
who is instrumentnl or jnvolvcd in preparing a Will was 
recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Tanner v. 
Public Trustee. 1 
THE FACTS: 
The facts of the case are quite complex, but for the 
purposes of this paper MacArthur J's lengthy examination 
of them can be compressed somewhat. 2 
The testatrix had made two Wills. One, dated the 13th of 
Fabruary 1961 (the 1961 Will), was drawn by the Public 
Trustee. The second, dated the 23rd December 1966 (the 
1966 Will), was drawn by Mr Tanner, the husband of the 
appellant. The two Wills differed in several respects, 
the major differences (following MacArthur J's discussion) 
were these:-
(a) A legacy of £2,000 to Mrs Tanner 1n the 1961 Will 
was replaced in the 1966 Will by a share of residue 
amounting to about £24,000. 
(b) A legacy of £1,000 to Mr Tanner in the 1961 Will was 
increased to £3,000 in the 1966 Will. 
(c) Legacies to old friends in the 1961 Will (one of £1,soo 
and two of £200) were omitted from the 1966 Will. 
(d) Legacies of £300 to four persons 1n the 1961 Will were 
replaced by shares of r esidue in the 1966 Will 
amounting to about £3,400 each. The four were all 
relatjves of Mrs Tanner, ana ~f the testatrix. 
(e) Legacies of shares of residue amounting to £12,000 
1 
2 
each in the 1961 Will to the Early Settlers Association, 
the New Zealand Poundation for the Blind, and the 
St. Mary's Girls' (Anglicau) !Iome were replaced by 
legacies to the first two charities of£1,000. Tl1e 
third charity was omitted from the J966 Will. 
Ywtod.a U11iver si,ty of 
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The re·lationships of the partj es were these: The testatrix 
was a Mrs Budd. The Budd's had two nieces, daughters of 
Mrs Budd's sister. One of them, Gladys, became Mrs Tanner 
by a second marriage in 1964. Mr Tanner worked in Mr Budd's 
business for many years, and had eventually become the 
proprietor of it. The Budd's had no children and Mr Tanner 
became in effect a son to Mr Budd. After Mr Budd's death in 
1960 Mr Tanner managed Mrs Budd's affairs until her deatl1 in 
1968. At all times she had complete trust and faith in him. 
Mrs Tanner also worked in the business and spent a lot of 
time with Mrs Budd. Particularly before Mrs Budd's admission 
to a rest home she was largely dependent on Mrs Tanner. 
Mrs Budd did not have a wide circle of close friends and she 
was somewhat shy of strangers. She became pro gressively 
more retiring. When it became difficult to obtain home 
help she was moved to a rest home. Mrs Tanner made all the 
arrangements for the move, and after it the Tan11ers were her 
frequent visitors. Her house was sold, a Power of Attorney 
being given to Mr Tanner for the purpose. A gift of the 
proceeds, being some £8,800, was made to Mrs Tanner. It was 
employed in her husband's business, but Mrs Budd did not know 
this. 
The sale and gift occurred in 1966 and 1n the same year 
Mrs Budd made an interest free loan of £10,000 to Mr Tanner 
in order that he might buy out his partner . Near the end 
of October in that year the question of Mrs Budd making a new 
Will arose. 
As part of their policy of quinquennial review of Wills held 
by them the Public Trust Office wrote to her pointing out 
that the St Mary's Girls' (Anglican) Home now formed part of 
a home for elderly women and that she might wish to alter her 
Will to provide for the disposition of that share of the 
residue. Apparently she then requested Mr Tanner to look 
into the matter and he then, for the first time, opened her 
bo x of papers which was being held at his home, and took 8 
copy of the 1961 Will out to her at the home. 
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Mr Tanner discussed the 1961 Will with Mrs Budd in order to 
determine jn what respects she wished to change it. It 
was found "that she repeatedly asked what she should do and 
Mr Tanner replied, 'It is your Will - your Will is your ,vish' 
and told her he could not tell her ,vhat she should do. 113 
As a result of the discussion Mr Tanner gave instructions to 
the Public Trust Office to prepare a new Will and they duly 
did so. The instructions for that Will were in fact those 
later embodied in the 1966 Will except in three respects:-
(a) They retained the two £200 legacies to two of Mrs 
Budd's friends 1n the 1961 Will which were omitted from 
the 1966 Will. 
(b) They provided a legacy of £500 for one friend who was 
entitled to £1,500 under the 1961 Will and who was 
omitt ctl from the 1966 Will. 
(c) Mr Tanner's legacy was increased from £1,000 in the 
1961 Will to £2,000. He was entitled to £3,000 under 
the 1966 Will. 
An officer of the Public Trust Office called on Mrs Budd with 
a Will drawn up in accordance with those instructions. He 
received an impression that she did not have the requisite 
testamentary capacity and left. He also doubted whether the 
ideas conveyed to his office were all hers. He contacted 
the attending physician at the home who met Mrs Budd and felt 
sure that she had the requisite capacity and ,vanted to change 
her Will. 
A second officer of the Public Trust Office called and he 
also felt she did not have the requisite capacity. On that 
day she was in bed and unwell. A further meeting with the 
Public Trust fell through as one officer was not available. 
Mr Tanner, being annoyed at these delays, decided to get his 
Solicitors to prepare a Will . Mr Young of Young, Bennett 
& Co. was consulted and Mr Tanner said it would be best if 
3 By Wild C.J. at the triaJ: unreported. Cited by MacArthur J. 1n the Court of Appeal at 78. 
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Mr Young saw Mrs Budd with a member of the family present, 
as Mrs Budd was something of a recluse a11d might not discuss 
matters without their presence. 
Mr Young discussed the position with his senior partner 
Mr Bennett. 4 They decided to see Mrs Budd without the family 
present and made an appointment to do so, advising the Public 
Trust Office. They found Mrs Budd cheerful and alert, but 
formed a definite opinion that she wished to leave things as 
they were. 
In the evening Mrs Budd told Mr Tanner that two nten had called 
to see her and that she did not know them and would have 
nothing to do with them. Mr Tanner said he could do no more 
for her 1n the matter of arranging her Will and she said to 
him "You can do it for me, can't you Walter?" 5 It was 
subs equently decided that Mr Tanner would prepare a Will. 
After a break while Mr Tanner was away on business, he 
eventually completed the Will. 
The execution was left in the hands of a Mr Curtis, who had 
been a friend of Mr Tanner for over twenty years and was a 
Justice of the Peace. On the 23rd of December 1966 Mr Tanner 
took Mr Curtis to the home, introduced him to Mrs Budd, and 
left them. Mr Curtis chatted with Mrs Budd for some time and 
formed a clear impression that she had testamentary capacity. 
He read the Will through to her, clause by clause, and she 
followed a copy of her own. At the end of each clause he 
asked her if that was what she wanted. 
When they had finished he asked her if she wanted to sign it, 
and called 1n the Matron. Mrs Budd signed the Will, and 
the Matron and Mr Curtis witnessed it. Mr Curtis did not 
know of the doubts which the Public Trust Office had as to 
whether Mrs Budd wished to change her Will, nor did he know 
4 Referred to by the Chief Justice as well known as a very careful family Solicitor of great experience. 
5 Per MacArthur J. at 80. 
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that officers of the Public Trust had previously expressed 
doubts as to Mrs Budd's testamentary capacity . 
On the 20th of May 1~68 Mrs Budd died, and Mr Tanner took the 
Wi l l (which he had held until that date) to the Public Trust 
Office , which had been named as executors in it . 
Tllli COURSE OF THE TRIAL, PLEADINGS ETC: 
The Public Trustee (who remained neutral throughout) 
instjtuted the action to obtain a decision of the Court as to 
which of the two Wills should be admitted to Probate . Bv , 
an order in chambers the New Zealand Foundation for the Blind 
was directed to represent all the beneficiaries who fared 
better under the 1961 Will, except for the Early Settlers 
Association who were to be separately represented , although 
t heir interests were virtually the same. 
Mrs Tanner was to represent all the beneficiaries who received 
more under the 1966 Will than the 1961 Will . The action 
became a contest bet11een Mrs Tanner , supporting the 1966 
Will , and the two charities whjch denied the validity of that 
Will , and supported the 1961 Will . 
THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF LAW: 
This case thus deals with the situation where a beneficiary 
of a Will has been instrumental jn its preparation. Thi:; 
must be clearly distinguished from cases of undue influence . 
Undue influence, as the term is used in connection with 
Wills , deals with coercion, usually by violence or threats 
of violence. 6 Tanner does not raise any such facts . It is 
clear that the Court of Appeal recognised this, MacArthur J . 
saying "These statements . . . . . do not raise any issue of 
fraud or undue influence. 117 Where undue influence is raised 
the onus of proving it is on the party who alleges it 1 not 
6 16 Ilalsbury, (3.ed . ) p.207(v): 17 llalsbury (3 . ed . ) 
p . 675, para . 1301. Also Winder; 3 M.L.R . 99 at 104 
and 56 L.Q.R . 97 at 106 . 
7 Tanner n.1 . at 71. 
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on the propounder of the Will, as it is here, 
A. Tl!E BASTC PRINCIPLE: 
A leading case 1n this fjeld 1s Barry~ Butlin, 8 where the 
testator's Wi 11 was dra1-m up by a Solicitor who took about 
a third of the testator's estate under it. Parke B. said 
that there were two settled rules in this area. "The first 
is that the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party 
propounding a Will; and he must satisfy the conscience of the 
Court that the instrument so propounded 1s the last Will of 
a free and capable testator. The second is, that if a 
party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a 
benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to 
excite the suspicion of the Court, and calls upon it to be 
vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of 
the instrument, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce 
unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially 
satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true 
Will of the deceased. 119 
In that case the Will was admitted to probate, the only son 
being a fugitive from justice, who had been shunned and feared 
by his father for many years. The law as there set out was 
affirmed in Fulton v, Andrew10 and Lord Hatherley elaborated 
on the distinction between a beneficiary who helps prepare 
the Will and an ordinary Jegatee. As to an ordinary legatee 
he said "It is enough in their case that the Will was read 
over to the testator and that he Ho.s of sound mind and memory 
and capable of understanding it. But there is a further onus 
upon those who take for tl1eir own benefit after having been 
instrumental in preparjng or obto.ining a Will. They have 
thrown on them the onus of showing the righteousness of the 
. 11 transaction." 
8 
9 
10 
11 
2 Moo P.C. Cas 480: 12 E.R. 1089 
Ibid 482 
(1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 448 
Jbi<l, 471 ~ 472 
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B. MATTERS ARISING IN TANNER: 
The cases already referred to have been adopted in New Zealand 
and affirmed in two cases; McDonald~ Valentine 12 and 
Chatterton v. Ilowie~ 3 However several points are made somewhat 
clearer by the decision in Tanner . 
i . THE ONUS or PROOF: 
The onus of proof clearly lies on the party propounding the 
Will. Generally that will be the executor and he need not 
necessarily be the beneficiary who has been involved in the 
preparation of the Will. This is clear from Tyrrell v. 
Painton14 where the executor was one son of the respondent 
and the Will was prepared by another son of the respondent. 
Here the procedure in Tyrrell's case was followed . As 
MacArthur J. put it, " In the present case, although it is the 
Public Trustee who is in the technical sense propounding the 
1966 Will, I think that the onus of proof l ies on Mrs Tanner 
and those whom she represents, including her husband . They 
support that Will as against the 1961 Will . The case has 
been pleaded and fought throughout on the basis that there 
is no distinction between them; and they must stand or fall 
together. " 15 
ii TIJE 'BENEFIT' 
Wild C. J . at the tria1 16 appears to have based his judgment 
on the benefit to Mr Tanner and the fact that his legacy 
increased to£3,000 from£1,000. 17 MacArthur J . found that 
he would have held the rule in ~arry v. Rutlin 18 to be 
applicable even had Mr Tanner taken nothing, "The reason 
being that the substantial gift of residue to his wife would 
have been a circumstance exciting the suspicion of the Court . " 19 
20 The justification for this is Tyrrell's case where, as ~e have 
12 (1921) N. Z. L. R. 49 18 See n.8 
13 (1926) N.Z.L.R. 595 19 Tanner n . 1. at 18, 1 8 -
14 (1894) P . 151 10 
15 Tanner n. 1 . at 73 20 Sec n. 14 
16 Unrepo.rted 
17 Tanner n.1. per MacATtlrnr J . 
at 7 3 , l 42 - 49 
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seen, the respondent took a substantial gift under a Will 
prepared by his son. It was helcl that the rule in 
Barry v, But 1 in 21 a pp 1 i c d , D a ,re y L . J . saying " I t must not 
be supposed that the principle in Barry v. Butlin is confined 
,to cases where the person who prepares the \\'ill is tl1e person 
who takes the benefit under it - that is one state of things 
whicl1 raises a suspicion; but the principle is, that whenever 
a Will is prepared under circumstances which raise a well 
grounded suspicio11 that it does not express the mind of the 
favqur testator the Court ought not to pronounce in / of it unless 
h . . . d 11 22 tat suspicion is remove . 
iii. THE 'TRANSACTION' 
Turner P. went into this area in some depth. He felt that 
Wild C.J., having found that Mr Tanner had failed to show 
the ' righteousness of the transaction ' as regaTds the increase 
in his legacy, was not bound to set aside the 1966 Will as a 
whole. 
Speaking of the trial decision he said ''It seems to me that 
(\Vild C.J . ) assumed that the ' transaction ' the ' righteousness' 
of which is to be made the subject of inquiry was the execution 
of the whole Will . But the cases do not appear to me to use 
the words 'the righteousness of the transaction' in quite this 
sense. These words , where they are used, seem to me to 
refer rather to the particular benefaction of the person 
propounding the Will, which may be quite a different matter , 
and may lead to quite a different result." 23 
He went on to consider Barry v. Butlin 24 Fulton v. Andre1v 25 
and Craig v. Lamoureux2 6 and concluded that in each of these 
cases 'the transaction' referred to was the transaction 
in respect of the legacy of the beneficiary who had prepared 
the Will. In respect of TyrrelJ v. Painton 27 he said 
"Davey L.J . does use the words in resolving the same question 
as that raised in this case - whether the wl1ole second W511 
21 See n . 8 
22 See n . 14 p.159 et seq 
23 Tanner n.1. at 90 
24 See n.8 . 
25 See n.10. 
26 (1920) A.C.349 
27 See n . 14 
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must be granted probate or not . But in that case it 
should be noted that the second Will gave to the proponent of 
it 'nearly the whole of the testatrix's property' - and 
accordingly the Will and the benefaction of the proponent 
could properly be regarded as in fact the same transaction. 
That cannot be said of the case before us, in which there 
were other very substantial beneficiaries named in the Will 
under ex&mination whose parts in the events under consideration 
were neve:r in the slightest degree assaiJed. 1128 
He concluded, regarding the righteousness of the transaction 
of the peTson propounding the Wi11 , that "the righteousness 
of the transaction is not properly to be accepted as a reason 
for refusing probate of the whole Will, including the 
benefactions of the niece, the grandnieces, and grandnephew, 
the righteousness of , .. ,hich was not attacked ." 29 
iv TIIE 'RULE' IN GUARDIIOUSE v BLACKDURN: 30 ------
The 1 rul e' arose as a result of a strict interpretation 
of The W:i.lls Act. 31 Guardhouse v Blackburn 32 was a 
case where two words inadvertently included by a Solicitor 
in a Codicil had the effect, if read literally, of defeating 
two very substantial legacies under the Wi11. Sir J . P. 
Wilde 33 held that (except where fraud had been practiced on 
the testator) "the fact that the Will has been duly read over 
to a capable testator on the occasion of its execution, or 
that its contents have been brought to his notice in any 
other way , s ho u 1 d , ,., hen coup 1 e d Hi t h h i s due exec u t i on 
thereof, be held conclusive evidence that he approved as 
well as knew the contents thereof." 34 
28 Tanner n.1. at 91 
29 TcTem -
30 (1866) L.R. 1. p & D 109 
31 1837 (U. K.) 
32 See n. 30 
33 Sitting alone 
34 See n. 30 at 116 
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At t er v. Atkin son 3 5 was a similar case. There, Sir J.P. Wilde 
(acldrc·ssing the Jury) saicl, in a case with facts similar 
to Tanner : 11 There is a proposition of law, however, uhich 
I consider it is my duty to put before you. The question 
of fact is, did (the testatrix) really ever read the contents 
of this document? If you are satisfied that she did read it, 
then, as a proposition of law, I feel bouncl to tell you that 
she must be tnken to have known and approved of its contents. 
If, being of sound mind and capacity, 36 she read this 
residuary clause, the fact that she afterwards put her 
signature to it is conclusive to show that she knew and 
approved of its contents. 11 3 7 
These statements have been approached with caution . The 
he adnote of Fulton v. Andrew 38 states, 11 Thcre is no unyielding 
rule of law (especially where the element of fraud enters 
into the case) that, when it has been proved that a testator, 
comp etent in mind, has had' a Will read over to him, and 
has thereupon executed it, all further enquiry is shut 
OU t. 11 3 9 
This area of the law was recently discussed in Re Morris 
(Deceased). 4o That h C d . · 1 was a case were a o 1c1 , as a 
result of a Solicitor's inadvertence, revoked clauses 3. and 7. 
of a Will instead of clauses 3. and 7(iv). Under clause 7. 
there were some twenty different legacies. The Court 
declined to grant prob a te of the Codicil. 
MacArthur J. discussed Guardhouse v. Blackburn an<l decided 
that while there may well have been ''good reasons in the 
interests of justice nearly 100 years ago which compelled the 
Court to fetter its own power to get at the true facts; that 
the more modern trend in many fields had been to strike such 
fetters off." 41 
36 And pre sumably, in the absence of fraud 
37 Sec n.35 (Again sitting alone) at 670 
3& See n.10. The headnote accurately expresses the decision 
on this point. 
39 Cited by Turner P. in Tanner n . 1 . at 89. 
40 (1971) P.62 
41 See n.1 . 74 
35 (J869) L.R. 1 PC D 665 
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H 1 d L JI . . 42 ea so quote atey s opinion that the modern position 
is as put by Sachs J. in Crerar v. Crcrar 43 and that the 
Court bas "to consider all the relevan t evidenc e availobJ e 
and then, drawing such inferences as it can from the tot a lity 
of that material it has to come to a conclusion whether or 
not those propounding the ¼ill have discharged the burden 
of establishing that the testatrix knew and approved the 
contents of the document which is put forward as a valid 
testamentary djsposition. The fact that the testatrix read 
the document, and the fact that she executed it, must be 
given the full weight apposite in the circumstances, but 1n 
l aw those facts are not conclusive nor do they raise a 
presumption of law." 44 
Although recognisjng that Re Morris (Deceased) 45 and 
46 Crerar v. Crerar were both cases involving mistake, 
MacArthur J. 'saw no reason why the principle should not be 
of a general application .' Thus he found that "I think that 
in the present case the facts that the Will was read 
over to the testatrix and that she executed it are not 
conclusive on the question whether she knew and approved the 
contents of the Will; but the facts must be given 'the full 
weight apposite in the circumstances'." 47 
Turner P. did not discuss Re Morris (Deceased)~ 8 hut he 
reached a similar conclusion based on Barry v. Butlin, 49 
so . 51 Fulton v. Andrew and Wintle~ Nye. 
SUMMARY OF TIIE COURT OF APPEAL I S DECISION: 
The Court of Appeal decided agajnst the appellants and 
the 1966 Will. Some of the reasons the judges gave relate 
to detailed study of the relationship of the evidence to various 
notes and papers and we do not have space to consider them, but 
the major reasons are more easily explained. 
42 See n.40 
43 Unreported (1956) Cited n.1. 74 
44 Cited n.l. 74 
45 Sec n . 40 
46 Unreported Cited n .1. 
47 See n.1. 74 
48 See n.40 
49 Sec n.8 
so See n.10 
51 (1959) 1 W.L. R. 284 
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For example:-
l 
ii 
''(2) Mrs Budd had complete trust and confidence 
in Mr Tanner as regards her business affairs and she 
relied on him alone. He was in a position of 
influence towards her. 11 5·2 
The difference between the 1966 Will and Mrs Budd's 
previous Wills (1961, 1952, and 1952) which were 
all quite similar. 
iii 11 (6) Mr Tanner kept the 1966 Will secret (except 
iv 
as regards his wife) until after Mrs Budd's death, 
a period of about 18 months. This is a suspicious 
circumstance which has been specifically referred 
53 to in some of the decided cases e.g. Wintle v. Nye." 
And lastly, the large intervivos gift to Mrs Tanner, 
and the large interest free loan to Mr Tanner. 
MacArthur J. concluded, "I have been left 1n no doubt, on a 
survey of the whole of the evidence, that the appellants 
have failed to establish the very heavy onus of proof that 
rests upon them, and that they have failed to show that the 
1966 Will does express the true Will of the deceased." 54 
Richmond J. concurred, giving no separate judgment. 
Turner P. agreed, saying ''I think that it has been necessary, 
in affirming (Wild C.J's) decision, as I now do, to state 
clearly what are the grounds upon which for myself I would 
affirm it. These do not include the righteousness of 
the transaction; 55 but a broad survey of the whole of the 
52 See n.1. at 85 
53 Idem 
54 Ibid, 87 
55 Bearing in mind the narrow scope he gives to the phrase 
'the righteousness of th e trans a ction'. He is 
referring to his affirmation of Wild C.J's decision 
to cut down the whole 1966 Will. 
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circumstances, which I adopt with gratitude from the judgment 
of ~iacArthur J., has left me in no doubt that their 
effect should have been - as it was - that those propoundiPg 
the second Will failed to satisfy him, in the words of 
Theobald 13th ed. 111, that the testatrix in fact knew and 
d f • 11 56 approve o its contents. 
Accordingly probate was granted of the 1961 Will. 
CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM THAT DECISION: 
A. WHY WAS TJIE WHOLE 1966 WILL SET ASIDE? 
i. It may be that the whole of the 1966 Will was set 
aside on the grounds of the first principle of Barry v Bu\li1t. 57 
That is, where any person propounds a Will there is an onus 
on them to satisfy the Court that the instrument so propounded 
is, in fact, the last Will of a free and capable testator. 
In general, in the case of the majority of Wills, the proof 
of due execution and the absence of any suspicious 
circumstances will be sufficient to satisfy the Court . 
However.where there are suspicious circumstances the Court 
will require much more strenuous proof. One of the most 
suspicious circumstances will be that a person who takes 
a benefit under the Will, has been instrumental in its 
preparation. In some cases the suspicion will be easily 
removed. Often aged persons will have assistance in their 
affairs from members of their families, and equally often 
they will make testamentary provision for such persons; but 
additional circumstances may make an apparently innocent 
assistance appear more sinister. 
It is clear from the cases that some of these additional 
circumstances will be : 
1 . A scheme of disposition markedly different from 
previous careful Wills and which has increased 
emphasis on the assisti11e party (or some person 
closely associated with him). 
56 
57 
Sec n . 1. at 92 
Sec n.8 oria Unlv1;:;rslty O 
Wdlington 
La Libr ry 
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2. The suppression of such a Will from other family 
members and friends until after the testator 's death. 
3. Generous provision for an assisting party alre ady 
generously provided for i11t ervivos, if at the expense 
of others not so provided for. 
Accordingly it seems that the suspicion of the Court was aroused 
against the propounder of the 1966 Will either on the ground 
that Mr Tanner's wife took a substantial bene fit under the 
Will and he had prepared it, or, on the grounds of his 
benefit. Once this suspicion was aroused the Court looked 
at all the evidence and found, not only had the Tanner's 
failed to satisfy the Court as to the righteousness of 
their transaction, but also that taki11g all the circumst ances 
into account the Court felt that th e onus prohnndi had not 
been satisfied; that is, that tl1e party propounding the Will 
had failed to satisfy them that the jnstrument so propounded 
was the last Will of a free and capable testator. To so 
find the Court need not have before it evidence of either fraud 
or undue influence. 
11 . It may also be that the whole of the 1966 Will was 
set aside because of the difficulties imposed by the pleading . 58 
He pointed out 59 that if the proceedings had been differently 
conducted it may have been possible to grant partial probate 
of the 19G6 Will, striking out the bequests of the Tanner's, 
but leaving the others intact. Is there any reason why he 
could not have disregarded the plc ~<lings and so decided? 
It seems clear from Rules 59. and 61. of the Code of Civil 
Procedure 60 that Wild C.J. was entitled so to join the parties . 
Rule 59 . (and similarly Rule 61.) talks of joining parties when 
58 By 'the pleadings ' Turner P. seems to have meant the 
joining of the Tanner 's with the other beneficiaries 
who took increased benefits under the 1966 Will. 
59 See N.1 . at 90 
60 Sims Ed 
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separate actions would give rise to "any common questions of 
law or fact." Were there any such common questions? 
If the Tanner's brought an action requesting probate of the 
1966 Will the questions of law involved would be, first, 
the general onus probandi, and second, the special onus 
thrown on them by Mr Tanner's participation in the preparation 
of the Will. If the others taking increased benefits under 
the 1966 Will requested probate, they would have thro,m 
on them only the general onus probandi. In both cases the 
same questions of fact would be canvassed. 
Accordingly it is submitted that the cases would have been 
similar enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 59. and 61 . 
They provide tl1at "judgment may be give1 for such one or more 
of (the parties who are joined) as may be found to be entitled 
to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, 
without any amendment." 
So the pleadings were not really a bar to Turner P. granting 
partial probate of the 1966 Will. The real bar,clearly, 
was his decision in terms of Barry v. Butlin 61 that the general 
onus probandi had not been satisfied, as regards the whole Will. 
B. WAS THE ONUS PROBANDI PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD IT THE 
SUPREME COURT? 
Could it be that Wild C.J. joined all those taking increased 
benefits under the 1966 Will as propounders because he 
regarded their benefits as suspect? If he regarded the 
benefits as suspect because of the relationship of those 
persons to Mr Tanner, then it may well be argued that his net 
was cast too wide. In cases where the benefit has gone 
not directJy to the preparcr the Courts have not put the 
relationship giving USC to suspicion much wider than husband 
and wife 1 or parent and child. 
61 See n.8 
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Whjle cases may no doubt be imagined where benefits to a 
person outs-ide those relationshjps with the preparer vierc 
regarded as suspect, it is submitted that to have done so 
here would have been incorrect. Especially where all those 
concerned were not only relatives of the preparer, but also 
the only close relations of the testatrix. 
No doubt a line must be drawn somewhere between persons 
who take a benefit, and have a relationship with the preparer, 
and those ordinary legatees' whose benefit is in no way suspect, 
but the Court of Appeal gives no indication where it ought 
to go in principle. As these cases always involve complex 
consider ations of the facts it may well, however, be best for 
the decision to be left to the Court in each case, than to 
lay down a possibly restrictive principle. 
C. WHEN SHOULD PARTIAL PROBATE BE GRA 7ED? 
Clauses are occasionally struck out of Wills. Sometimes as 
b . 63 . b e1ng too vague, sometimes ecause 
impossible to fulfill 64 and so on. 
they contain conditions 
But what of a case 
where a legacy has been held invalid by virtue of suspicion 
attacl1ing from participation in the preparation of the Will? 
If the suspect legacy is ruled out, is the testator's Will 
given better effect by the granting of partial probate of that 
Will, or by granting probate of an earlier Will (or finding 
the deceased intestate)? 
A certain reluctance to grant partial probate is understandable. 
Thjs would arise from a feeling that the suspect benefit may 
have been given ''at the expense" of other beneficiaries, and 
that persons who take under the contested Will might have been 
differently (usually more generously) dealt with had there been no 
suspect bequest. On the other hand, those taking even if 
partial probate is granted may well receive more than under a 
previous Will (as would have been the case for the other 
beneficiaries under the 1966 Will in Tanner) 
63 ln Re Warren (Dec'd), TayJor v. Warren (1934) N.Z.L. R. 
s-:T93 
64 Re Smith (Dec'd) (1908) G.L.R. 111 
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As Tanner clearly shows the a11swcr 1s that where the Court 
is convince<l that the circumstances surrounding the Will are 
such that they do not feel that it represents the true 
Will of the testator in any respect then they should cut it 
down in toto. But where they feel that the non-suspect 
bequests do express the true Will of the deceased then 
partial probat e should be granted . 
D. WAS TURNER P. CORRECT AS TO THE EFFECT OF PARTIAL 
PROBATE OF TIIE 1966 WILL? 
Turner P. said that 62 granting partial probate of the rest 
of the 1966 Will (disallowing the bequests to the Tanner ' s) 
would have had the same result, as far as they were 
concerned, as cutting down the whole Will . It is submitted 
that this view may be incorrect . 
Presumably if the whole 1966 Will was cut down the Tanner ' s 
took their bequests under the 1961 Will . That would have 
given (and presumably did give) Mrs Tanner £2 , 000 and 
Mr Tanner £1 , 000 . On the other hand if partia l probate 
was granted of the 1966 Will (i.e . cutting down only 
the bequests to the Tanner's) then the Tanner's would prima 
facie take nothing. However the prima facie disentitlcment 
might have been alleviated by the Administration Act , 1952 . 
As Mrs Tanner's bequest was a fraction of residue , Mrs Budd 
would have been intestate as to that fraction . Under 
S.56.l(e) of the Act it would app ear that half of that 
fraction would go to Mrs Tanner and half to her sister, as 
they arc the two members of the class that takes . They 
would take because Mrs Budd left no spouse , no issue and 
(pre sumably) no parents . That leaves Mrs Tanner and her 
sister as issue of the next class - brothers and sisters 
of the deceased. 
That would gjve Mrs Tanner £12,000, unless the Court could 
find so~e reason for refusing to apply the Act. They might 
62 See n.1 90 
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claim a jurisdiction to pr event a statute being used as an 
instrument of fraud (but no fraud 1s here alleged), or 
to prevent anyone profiting by their own wrong (and there is 
no suggestion of any wrong by Mrs Tanner). And only 
a suspicion attached to her husband. 
If this possibility ocurred to the Court of Appeal it 
is interesting to speculate as to whether it may have 
influenced their decision to cut down the whole 1966 Will. 
,vJ I 
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